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According to a view I will dub classical internalism, one knows that
p only if one justifiably believes that p. And one’s belief that p is
justified only if one is able to access the facts on which one’s justi-
fication that p supervenes by reflection alone.1 In this way, classical
internalism takes reflection to be essential to both justified belief and
knowledge.
In contrast, a view I will dub classical externalism has that one jus-
tifiably believes that p if and only if one’s belief that p is reliably
produced.2 Since reliability is independent of reflection, this means
that, on classical externalism, reflection is not essential to justified be-
lief. And since knowledge arguably features no other condition that
essentially involves the reflection, the same goes, mutatis mutandis,
for knowledge.
Classical internalism has come under considerable pressure in re-
cent literature. The reason for this is that the view threatens to over-
intellectualise knowledge in the sense that it excludes cognitively un-
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1 Roderick Chisholm [e.g. 1977] and Laurence BonJour [e.g. 1985, 2003] are per-
haps the most prominent champions of accessibilism in the 20th century. However,
the view has a number of further supporters including Robert Audi [e.g. 2001],
Carl Ginet [e.g. 1975], Matthias Steup [e.g. 1999] and Declan Smithies [e.g. 2012].
2 The perhaps most prominent advocates of reliabilism are Alvin Goldman [e.g.
1979] and Ernest Sosa [e.g. 1980]. However, the view has a number of further
noteworthy supporters, including Juan Comesana [e.g. 2010], Sandy Goldberg [e.g.
2010], Peter Graham [e.g. 2012], John Greco [e.g. 1999], Hilary Kornblith [e.g. 2002]
and Jack Lyons [e.g. 2009], to name but a few. I have also defended versions of the
view elsewhere [e.g. Author 2016a,b].
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sophisticated agents such as small children and animals from hav-
ing knowledge. However, this appears rather implausible [e.g. Burge
2003: 503, see also Dretske e.g. 1981]. Partly in response to such diffi-
culties, some internalists have moved away from the classical view
according to which reflection is essential to knowledge and justi-
fied belief and have embraced alternative versions of the view that
can steer clear of these difficulties. The most prominent alternative
claims, roughly, that facts about justification supervene on facts about
one’s mental life.3 Since even unsophisticated agents can have a men-
tal life, the prospects of avoiding the overintellectualisation problem
for classical internalism start to look up.
I believe that it is fair to say that the general trend in recent lit-
erature has been away from taking reflection to play essential role in
the analysis of knowledge and justified belief. In view of this, it may
come as some surprise that one of the most promising attempts at
rehabilitating reflection in epistemology is due to Ernst Sosa, a card-
carrying externalist if ever there has been one. More specifically, Sosa
argues that reflection is essential to the kind of knowledge that is of
central epistemological interest, to wit, human knowledge.
In this paper, I will take a closer look at Sosa’s attempt at re-
habilitating reflection in epistemology. My goal is twofold. First, I
will argue that Sosa’s view remains ultimately unsatisfactory as it
succumbs to a version of the familiar overintellectualisation worry.
Second, I will offer an alternative view on behalf of Sosa. While this
alternative can not only avoid the costs but also secure the benefits of
Sosa’s view, I will argue that it fails to properly rehabilitate the role
of reflection in epistemology. I thus remain critical on this front. First
things first, however, I will briefly outline Sosa’s account of human
knowledge.
1 Sosa’s View
Like many recent virtue epistemologists, Sosa takes his account of
knowledge to drop out of an application of a general account of the
normativity of performances to belief. Given that this is so, I will first
look at his account of performance normativity.
In the first instance, performances—or, to be more precise, per-
formances with an aim—can be evaluated along the following three
3 This view is most prominently defended by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman
[e.g. 2001].
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dimensions: success, competence and aptness. Roughly, a perfor-
mance is successful if and only if it attains its aim, it is competent if
and only if it is produced by the exercise of a competence to attain
its aim, and it is apt if and only if it is successful because competent.
For instance, an basketball player’s shot is successful if and only if it
goes in, it is competent if and only if it is produced by an exercise
of a competence to make shots, and it is apt if and only if it goes in
because of the exercise of the competence to make shots.
While this gives us the basic account for first order evaluations of
performances, Sosa does not take this to be the whole story about the
normativity of performances. Rather, he countenances two further
types of aptness, alongside first order aptness, or ‘animal’ aptness as
Sosa calls it. These additional types of aptness are ‘reflective’ and
‘full’ aptness. Attaining these further types of aptness requires suc-
cessful and indeed apt performance at a higher order, in addition to
animal aptness. In a nutshell, the thought is that performances will
rise to these higher levels of aptness only if, alongside animal apt-
ness, one has aptly ascertained that one’s performance is free from
any relevant risk one may be running: one must have arrived at an
apt awareness that one’s performance would be apt. While animal
aptness in conjunction with apt risk assessment will be enough for
reflective aptness, full aptness additionally requires that the first and
the second order aptness are connected in the right way: one must be
guided to animal aptness by one’s reflectively apt risk assessment.
There are a number of normative properties that performances
can enjoy. Crucially, according to Sosa, full aptness enjoys special
status among these properties. Since Sosa’s view on the special status
of full aptness will be of considerable importance in what follows, I’d
like to take a look at a few passages in which Sosa clarifies what he
has in mind:
The fully desirable status for performances in general is full
aptness: it is aptness on the first order guided by apt
awareness on the second order that the first order per-
formance would be apt (likely enough).
[Sosa 2015: 85, my emphasis]
[E]ven while succeeding in its basic aim, a performance
falls short if it neglects attaining that aim aptly. This latter
is an aim also required for full credit in the domain of that
performance. What is yet more, full credit requires that
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this aim too be attained aptly. [. . . ] That is so for all first-
order performances, in whatever domain, whether cognitive or
not.
[Sosa 2015: 86, my emphases]
Note that Sosa is clear that full aptness is the fully desirable status
for performances in a given domain and that performances fall short
unless they attain full aptness. Moreover, he is also clear that this
claim holds with full generality. In view of this, it seems fair to
attribute the following thesis to Sosa:
The Normative Thesis (NT). Any performance in any domain attains
fully desirable status qua performance in that domain if and
only if it is fully apt; and it falls short qua performance in that
domain if and only if it isn’t.
Why think NT is true? To see how Sosa ventures to answer this
question, let’s return to the basketball case. In particular let’s look at
two versions of it. In both versions (i) your shot is animal apt and
(ii) you are very close to the edge of the range of your competence to
make shots. Now, in the first version of the case, you are blissfully
ignorant of just how far your range extends. As a result, had you
been a step further away, you would have taken the shot just the
same. In contrast, in the second version of the case, you are well
aware of how far your range extends. In particular, you are aware
that while you are just within your range, any further away from the
basket would already be too far for you. In view of this awareness
of your range, you take the shot. In this case, had you been a step
further away, you wouldn’t have taken the shot.
Sosa’s observation here is that, in the first version of the case, your
performance falls short qua basketball performance. You may right-
fully be scolded by your coach for ignoring the importance of shot
selection. Only in the second version will you remain clear of such
criticisms. Since your performance is animal apt in both versions of
the case, fully satisfactory performance must require more than an-
imal aptness. Sosa’s proposal is that what is required in addition is
apt performance at the second order and, in particular, full aptness.
With these points about Sosa’s general account of the normativity
of performances in play, let’s move on to epistemology. In order to
connect these two issues, Sosa embraces the following thesis:
The Psychological Thesis (PT). Belief is a type of performance with an
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aim. More specifically, it is an epistemic type of performance
that constitutively aims at truth.
While PT does not go uncontested [e.g. Chrisman 2012], for the pur-
poses of this paper, I will simply grant Sosa that it is true. But, of
course, if belief is a performance with an aim, the general account of
the normativity of performances can be applied to belief. We can ask
whether a given belief is successful, i.e. whether it is true, whether it
is competent, and whether it rises to various levels of aptness.
Most importantly for present purposes, NT and PT jointly entail
the following:
Fully Desirable Belief (FDB). A belief attains fully desirable status qua
epistemic performance if and only if it is fully apt. It falls short
qua epistemic performance if and only if it isn’t fully apt.
Note that FDB is an epistemologically highly interesting claim. After
all, if there is such a thing as fully desirable status for belief, then
it also makes sense to specially care about beliefs that attain fully
desirable status. FDB not only implies that there such a thing as fully
desirable status for belief, it also tells us what exactly fully desirable
status of belief amounts to, i.e. fully apt belief.
Finally, the last key thesis of Sosa’s view is epistemological in
nature. Here goes:
The Epistemological Thesis (ET). Human knowledge is fully apt belief.
ET is attractive because not in the least because it can offer a highly
attractive account of the value of human knowledge. After all, ET
and FDB jointly entail that a belief attains fully desirable status if
and only if it qualifies as human knowledge. Given that it makes
sense to specially care about belief that attains full desirable status,
we get the result that it makes sense to specially care about human
knowledge, which, in turn, goes a long way toward explaining the
special value of knowledge.
While the account of the value of knowledge is certainly one at-
traction of Sosa’s view, it is not the only one. Sosa argues that it
enables us to solve a range of long-standing epistemological prob-
lems, including the Gettier problem and the problem of fake barn
cases. For the purposes of this paper, I will set these issues aside.
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2 The Status of Reflection
What I’d like to focus on instead is the status of reflection in Sosa’s
epistemology. Note first that, by Sosa’s account of full aptness, fully
apt belief requires the apt exercise of monitoring competences, i.e.
a form of reflective competence. In this way, reflection features es-
sentially in what, by FDB, is belief that attains fully desirable status.
Already at this stage there is reason to think that if Sosa is right,
reflection does play a central role in epistemology. After all, it is es-
sential to the status of belief that we have special reason to care about.
ET then ties this back to human knowledge. The result that we get is
not only that human knowledge is something it makes sense for us to
specially care about, it is also a kind of state that essentially involves
reflection. In this way, Sosa’s view promises to rehabilitate reflection
in epistemology.
At the same time, note that reflection does not enter the picture at
the specifically epistemological level. Rather, it already comes in with
Sosa’s general account of the normativity of performances. After all,
reflective competences are essential not only for fully apt belief but
for fully apt performance in general. Of course, there is no in prin-
ciple problem with this. In fact, it might be thought that this only
means that Sosa’s rehabilitation of reflection in epistemology is par-
ticularly well motivated as it simply drops out of an independently
plausible view and that, as a result, the overintellectualisation objec-
tions that have been raised against classical internalism will in any
case have much less force against Sosa.
While this might appear to be an attractive move for fans of Sosa,
on reflection, it is just a bit too quick. If it is indeed correct that re-
flective competences are essential for performances that attain fully
desirable status in general, then the force of the overintellectualisa-
tion objections will have been mitigated. Not so if it turns out that
there are cases in which reflective competences are not essential for
performances that attain fully desirable status. After all, in that case,
we will have reason to think that NT is false.
The trouble is, of course, that there is excellent reason to think that
reflective competences are indeed not required for performances to
attain fully desirable status. After all, it is overwhelmingly plausible
that performances of unsophisticated agents, i.e. agents who are not
endowed with reflective competences, can nonetheless attain fully
desirable status. Take the waggle dance of honey bees, for instance.
Surely, when a bee performs a waggle dance, her performance can
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attain fully desirable status. At the same time, there is little doubt
that honey bees are not endowed with reflective competences and so
are not even in a position to rise to the level of fully apt performance.
What comes to light is that Sosa does encounter an overintellectu-
alisation objection after all. Interestingly enough, the worry arises
in the first instance not for his epistemological claim but for his key
normative claim, NT.4
The falsity of NT has important ramifications for Sosa. After all,
since FDB was motivated by NT and PT, FBD loses its key source of
support. Similarly, unless FDB is true, ET loses a great deal of its
attraction also. After all, we will now have to answer the question
of why we should identify human knowledge with fully apt belief
rather than some other property such as apt belief or reflectively apt
belief or, perhaps, whatever else may turn out to be required for belief
that attains fully desirable status.
At this point, it might be objected that while PT and ET come
close enough to Sosa’s view for many purposes, they actually don’t
represent Sosa’s view quite accurately, at least not his most recent
view from Judgment and Agency. After all, there Sosa takes human
knowledge to be a species of judgement or judgemental belief. And
unlike belief, which aims at truth, judgement in addition aims at
(alethic) aptness. Unsophisticated agents aren’t in a position to make
judgements in the first place. As a result, the overintellectualisation
objection is misplaced.
Even if this works, it will not help Sosa to rescue NT (or episte-
mologically relevant instances of it, for that matter). To see why not,
note that if NT holds (or epistemologically relevant instances of it), a
judgement attains fully desirable status if and only if it is fully apt.
If we wanted to identify human knowledge with any kind of judge-
ment, it had better be fully apt judgement. After all, if we want to say
that human knowledge is a species of judgement, we would surely
not want to allow that it is a species of judgement that might still fall
4 Couldn’t Sosa avoid this problem by restricting the claim that the fully desir-
able status for performances is full aptness to performances of (adult) humans and
weakening the requirement for performances of unsophisticated agents, perhaps to
animal aptness? Even if we can get rid of the air of ad hocness that might appear
to trouble this proposal, note that in Section 3, I will develop an alternative to NT
on behalf of Sosa that can offer a unified account of the performances of both un-
sophisticated and sophisticated agents, while also accommodating the motivations
for NT. As a result, this move is bound to remain unsuccessful at any rate because
a more choiceworthy alternative to resulting view is available.
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short qua epistemic performance. But now note that Sosa himself ac-
knowledges that apt judgement already requires one to affirm aptly
in the endeavour to (alethically) affirm aptly [Sosa 2015: 77]. This
means that fully apt judgement requires us in addition (at least) to
arrive at an apt awareness that we would indeed affirm aptly in the endeav-
our to (alethically) affirm aptly and for our apt affirmation in the endeavour
to affirm aptly to be guided by this apt awareness. And I take it that this
would be a too demanding requirement on human knowledge even
by Sosa’s lights. After all, for many of us (adult humans), it is doubt-
ful whether we ever arrive an apt awareness that we would affirm
aptly in the endeavour to (alethically) affirm aptly as we might just
not have the sophistication to even entertain so complex a thought.
And even those of us who do attain this level of sophistication, it
remains doubtful just how frequently we actually take the time to
process so complex a thought. By the same token, there is reason to
believe that if human knowledge does require fully apt judgement,
we don’t have a lot of it.
If Sosa wants to unpack human knowledge as a species of judge-
ment, he will thus do well to analyse it as apt judgement rather than
fully apt judgement. But that result does not sit well with NT, es-
pecially given that we attain fully apt judgement only rarely if ever.
After all, if NT holds, then any judgement that is apt but not fully
apt will fall short qua epistemic performance. Since we attain fully
apt judgement only rarely if ever, this means that the vast majority
of judgements that qualify as human knowledge simultaneously fall
short qua epistemic performances. And that just appears to be ever
so implausible.
3 Rescue Mission
I take these considerations to provide good reason for thinking that
NT is false. That, of course, is bad news for Sosa, for reasons already
indicated. If NT is false, why should we care specifically about fully
apt performances? And why should we identify human knowledge
with fully apt belief (or judgement for that matter)? That said, I do
believe that a lot of Sosa project can be rescued. In what follows, I
will outline how.
First, I’d like to propose the following simple alternative to NT:
The Simple Normative Thesis (SNT). The fully desirable status for per-
formances in general is (simple first-order) aptness.
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It is easy to see that SNT avoids the overintellectualisation worry
that NT encounters. (Simple first-order) aptness does not require re-
flective competence. As a result, even the performances of agents
who don’t have the cognitive sophistication requisite for reflective
competence may attain fully desirable status. SNT will also enable
us to follow Sosa in analysing human knowledge as a species of
judgement—to wit, apt judgement—without either succumbing to
a sceptical threat or allowing that the vast majority of our judge-
ments that qualify as human knowledge still fall short qua epistemic
performances. After all, on SNT, apt judgement is judgment that is
fully satisfactory qua epistemic performance is apt judgement. So,
judgements that qualify as human knowledge do not fall short qua
epistemic performance. And since apt judgement is something that
we frequently attain, the sceptical threat can be avoided also.
While all of this is good news for SNT, the view comes under
pressure from the kinds of cases that Sosa adduced to motivate NT.
Recall that Sosa offered two basketball cases. In both of them (i) your
shot is apt and (ii) you are very close to the edge of the range of your
competence to make shots. In the second case you are aware of how
far your range extends and, in view of this awareness, you take the
shot. In the first case, in contrast, you take the shot despite the fact
that you have no idea that you are still within your range. Sosa’s
key observation was that your performance attains fully satisfactory
status only in the second case; in the first case it falls short qua bas-
ketball performance. But of course your performance is apt in both
cases. If this is correct, SNT cannot be true.
Here, then, is my response to this worry. First, note that, as Sosa
also acknowledges, performances can be nested [2015: 126]. For in-
stance, your performance of turning on the light may be nested in the
performance of alerting your lover that you are home. What’s more,
the nested performance may be apt whereas the nesting performance
isn’t. You may have aptly turned on the light, without aptly having
alerted your lover, say because he wasn’t anywhere near your house
and so couldn’t see the sign.
In the basketball case, we also find nesting. In particular, I’d like
to distinguish between two performance types in basketball: shot and
play. I take it to be clear what a shot is in basketball. A play in
basketball is a performance type involving the implementation of a
choice of a more specific way of playing: taking a shot, making a
pass, continuing to dribble, etc. It is easy to see that, in basketball,
9
shots are nested in plays.
Crucially, each performance type can attain fully desirable status.
There is such a thing as a fully desirable shot and such a thing as a
fully desirable play. On SNT, a shot is fully desirable if and only if it
is an apt shot, and a play is fully desirable if and only if it is an apt
play. According to the present proposal, in both cases, you produce
an apt shot. However, only in the second case do you produce an
apt play. After all, the performance type play involves selection of a
performance at the level of shot (e.g. shoot, pass, dribble). It makes
sense that for the play to be apt, the performance nested in it must
be apt, its selection must be apt and apt selection must lead the way
to the aptness of the nested shot. Since in the first case, your shot
is not aptly selected, the play is not going to be apt. On SNT, then,
in both cases, your shot attains fully satisfactory status, but only in
the second case does your play attain this status. And this latter
fact explains the intuition that there is something amiss with your
performance in the first case.
It may also be worth noting that this account of nested perfor-
mances can make good sense of the relation between belief and judge-
ment. More specifically, the idea here would be that belief corre-
sponds to a performance at the level of shot in basketball and judge-
ment to a performance at the level of play. In a way, then, we can
think of belief as a doxastic shot and of judgement as one form of a
doxastic play (i.e. in the case of a judgement that p, a doxastic play
involving belief that p). This view has a couple of appealing features:
first, it predicts that judgement that p nests and so entails belief that
p; second, it predicts the aptness conditions for judgement that Sosa
also countenances. Just like an apt play in basketball, an apt doxastic
play (i) will of course require the nested doxastic performance at the
level of shot (e.g. belief) to be apt and (ii) will in addition require that
the selection of a doxastic performance at the level of shot (i.e. belief,
suspension of judgement, disbelief) and (iii) the apt selection must
lead the way to the aptness of the nested belief.
4 Back to the Status of Reflection
While NT got Sosa’s view into trouble, it now transpires that there
is an attractive fix available to Sosa. Most importantly for present
purposes, while, on this proposal, reflection does not play a key role
in the theory of the normativity of performances in general, we may
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still be able to rehabilitate reflection in epistemology. After all, the
present proposal does follow Sosa in identifying human knowledge
with apt judgement. But, as we have just seen, apt judgement does
require the exercise of reflective competence. Reflection thus turns
out to be essential for human knowledge. Its role will be rehabilitated
in epistemology.
Before closing, I’d like to briefly turn to the question as to whether
this rehabilitation ultimately succeeds. As a first observation, note
that, as epistemologists, our primary interest lies of course with the
nature of knowledge and, more specifically, with the normative ele-
ment involved in knowing that makes knowledge distinctively valu-
able. According to Sosa’s original proposal, this normative element
is full aptness. Since full aptness essentially involves reflection, it can
reasonably be thought to rehabilitate the role of reflection in episte-
mology.
The trouble is that once we replace Sosa’s original proposal by the
one developed above, the distinctively normative element involved in
knowing is simple first-order aptness. And simple first order aptness
does not essentially involve reflection. But it would then seem as
though the proposal I developed on behalf of Sosa is unfit to rehabil-
itate reflection in epistemology.
Here is another way of making this point. According to the stan-
dard overintellectualisation objection, cognitively unsophisticated agents
can have knowledge. But since, due to lack of sophistication, they
aren’t even in the ballpark of reflection, reflection isn’t essential to
knowledge. Sosa’s original proposal effectively deals with the over-
intellectualisation objection by relegating the cognitively unsophisti-
cated. Even if we grant that their beliefs qualify as knowledge, what
they can attain is a second-rate kind of knowledge at best. After all,
since they lack reflective competences and so are not in the ballpark
of full aptness, any beliefs they may form, i.e. even those that qualify
as knowledge, are and will always be bound to fall short qua epis-
temic performances. First-rate knowledge, which involves belief that
doesn’t fall short qua epistemic performance, requires full aptness
and so reflective competence. It is easy to see that this will work
as a rehabilitation of reflection in epistemology. After all, first-rate
knowledge clearly deserves a special place in epistemology. And if
first-rate knowledge requires reflection, so does reflection.
Once we abandon Sosa’s original proposal in favour of the one I
sketched above, the beliefs of cognitively unsophisticated agents are
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no longer bound to fall short qua epistemic performances. All that’s
required for belief that attains fully desirable status (and so doesn’t
fall short qua epistemic performance) is aptness. And even unso-
phisticated agents can achieve this. On this proposal, then, there is
no such thing as second-rate knowledge. All knowledge, whether in
unsophisticated or sophisticated agents, is first-rate knowledge. But,
crucially, the lesson that the cognitively unsophisticated teach us is
that knowledge does not require reflection. So, first-rate knowledge
doesn’t require reflection. And that does just not sound like a suc-
cessful rehabilitation of reflection in epistemology.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have taken a closer look at Sosa’s virtue epistemology
with a specific eye towards whether the view serves to rehabilitate
the role of reflection in epistemology. I argued that the key norma-
tive thesis in Sosa’s framework—that the fully desirable status for
performances in general is full aptness (NT)—falls prey to a version
of the overintellectualisation objection that is familiar from the litera-
ture on classical internalism in epistemology. I then outlined one way
of rescuing Sosa’s view from this objection, which replaces NT by
the thesis that the fully desirable status of performances in general is
simple first-order aptness (SNT), and showed how the kinds of cases
that Sosa adduces to motivate NT can be accommodated in terms
of nested performances. Finally, I returned to the issue of the sta-
tus of reflection and argued that while Sosa’s original proposal does
serve to rehabilitate reflection in epistemology, the better alternative I
proposed on behalf of Sosa doesn’t. As virtue epistemologists, then,
we will do well to continue to think of reflection has having been
dislodged from its throne in epistemology.
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